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Recent studies indicate that the insanity defense is raised in only one
percent of all felony cases in the United States.1 Yet this seemingly low
percentage computes to an average of approximately three-hundred in-
sanity pleas per state, or sixteen-thousand nationwide per year.2 Once a
criminal defendant has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, the
state determines sentencing by balancing its duty to protect society from
dangerous offenders and the legally innocent defendant's right to free-
dom. Criminal law serves the purpose of protecting society by punishing
wrongdoers.3 However, the law recognizes that certain offenders should
not be held responsible for their conduct.4
1. Andrew Blum, Debunking Myths of the Insanity Plea, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 9.
2. Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasewark, National Survey of the Frequency and Success of
the Insanity Plea and Alternate Pleas, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 208-09 (1989). The estimates are
based on an average of five states: Colorado, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wyoming, which
responded to a survey of the number of defendants utilizing the insanity defense in 1985. The survey
indicated a large variance in the frequency with which the defense is used among jurisdictions. For
example, Colorado reported only 45 insanity pleas, while Michigan reported 1,215 for the same
period. Id. at 208.
3. Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally 1ll Verdict Has Both Suc-
ceeded in its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U.
CIN. L. REV. 943, 958-62 (1987). Six differing theories are widely recognized in criminal law as a
basis for imposing criminal liability:
(1) general deterrence-to deter the public from imitating the defendant's bad acts; (2)
specific deterrence-to deter the defendant from repeating his misconduct; (3) rehabilita-
tion-to transform the wrongdoer into a law-abiding person; (4) restitution-to restore the
victims of crimes to their pre-crime position; (5) retribution-to satisfy society's need to see
evil punished; and (6) incapacitation-to segregate in order to protect society from the
defendant's future bad acts.
Id. at 958-59 (citations omitted). However, the author notes that only retribution is satisfied by
punishing an individual who is theoretically incapable of controlling his conduct because of a mental
illness. Under the retributionist perspective, moral responsibility is necessary to maintain public
order even when the individual who commits a criminal act does so because of a defective mental
condition. Proponents of this theory argue that attaching some form of liability to criminal acts
satisfies the public's need for revenge. Id. at 959-60. The author rejects this theory and reports that
polls indicate the general public believes that persons who are genuinely unable to control their
conduct or choose between right and wrong should not be held criminally responsible. Id. at 964-65.
4. Id. at 952. The author discusses other defenses recognized by the law which also exculpate
the defendant. Under the infancy defense, a minor may be held legally blameless after committing
an act for which an adult would be held accountable. Similarly, an individual who commits a crime
while acting under duress will not be held criminally liable for the act. Id. at 957.
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While a successful defense means that a defendant is not legally to
blame for his crime, it is not equivalent to an approval of his actions.
Society may have a strong interest in restraining or confining an individ-
ual whose behavior is unacceptable, even though he is not legally respon-
sible for his actions.' The state confines an insanity acquittee in a mental
institution for two primary reasons: (1) to treat and protect the rights of
mentally ill citizens; and (2) to protect the remainder of society from the
criminally insane.6
Theoretically, confinement of the criminally insane is not punitive in
nature. However, some commentators have posited that lower standards
for commitment of insanity acquittees than for those civilly committed,
coupled with indefinite commitment periods, violate the insanity acquit-
tee's due process and equal protection rights.' It is argued that differ-
ences in treatment between those civilly committed and those committed
as a result of an insanity verdict are evidence of punitive motivesA Con-
versely, the public is often outraged when criminals perceived as violent
escape punishment by pleading insanity,9 particularly when those indi-
viduals are released and perpetrate further violence. 10
On May 18, 1992, the United States Supreme Court examined these
5. Id. at 953. Although the law allows certain defenses to morally exculpate the defendant,
the law may restrict the freedom of those individuals in order to protect society. For example,
minors who commit acts that would bear criminal responsibility if they were adults may be confined
to a juvenile detention center for several years. Minors may also have to undergo psychiatric testing
and treatment, further being subject to parole restrictions upon release from the detention center.
Thus, defenses represent "the law's ability to assign or excuse from criminal responsibility while
simultaneously protecting itself from those who may be morally blameless yet physically danger-
ous." Id.
6. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (stating that the purpose of the defendant's
commitment was to treat his illness and to protect him and others from his potential dangerousness;
therefore, the potential prison sentence he could have received was irrelevant to the time necessary
for treatment).
7. Janet L. Polstein, Note, Throwing Away the Key: Due Process Rights of Insanity Acquittees
in Jonei v. United States, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 479, 480-81 (1985).
8. Id.; see also Comment, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV.
605, 607 (urging that although courts maintain that confinement of insanity acquitees is not punitive,
lower standards of proof for commitment of insanity acquittees evinces a desire to punish).
9. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 943.
10. David D. Marsh, Case Note, Criminal Law-Guilty But Mentally Il-A Verdict of Guilty
But Mental Ill Is Constitutional, and the Associated Treatment Provisions Do Not Deprive a Defend-
ant of Equal Protection, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 715, 717 (1985). Marsh gives an example of two
individuals who had been recently released from a mental institution where they had been commit-
ted as a result of not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts. Under the Michigan statute, a defendant
was entitled to a hearing after such a verdict to determine the defendant's current mental state. The
State failed to prove insanity at the hearing and the defendants were released. Within a year of
release, one defendant was convicted of raping two women, and the other was convicted of murder-
ing his wife. The public outrage was immense, and the Michigan legislature responded by creating a
verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Id.; see infra pp. 554-56 for a discussion of the Michigan verdict.
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issues in Foucha v. Louisiana." In Foucha, the Court declared unconsti-
tutional a Louisiana statute that required a defendant who has been
found not guilty by reason of insanity to prove that he no longer poses a
danger to himself or others before he can be released from a mental insti-
tution."2 According to the statutory scheme, once a defendant has been
acquitted by reason of insanity, he may be automatically committed to a
mental institution until the court orders release based upon a doctor's
recommendation. Such a recommendation is made only when the de-
fendant proves that he would no longer pose a danger to himself or
others.13  The Supreme Court found that placing such a burden on a
defendant was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clause. 4 This note examines the conflicting interests of the state in light
of the Foucha decision: protecting the rights of mentally ill citizens while
protecting the remainder of society from their potentially dangerous
actions. This note then discusses possible solutions to some of the
problems encountered in sentencing insanity acquittees.
II. BACKGROUND
Terry Foucha was charged with aggravated burglary and illegal dis-
charge of a firearm.1 He entered a plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, and the trial court appointed two experts in forensic psychiatry to
examine him.' 6 Based upon the report of the experts, the trial court
11. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
12. Id. at 1788.
13. Louisiana's criminal procedure provides:
after considering the report or reports filed pursuant to Articles 655 and 656, the court
may either continue the commitment or hold a contradictory hearing to determine whether
the committed person can be discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger
to others or to himself. At the hearing the burden shall be upon the committed person to
prove that he can be discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger to others
or to himself. After the hearing, and upon filing written findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the court may order the committed person discharged, released on probation subject
to specified conditions for fixed or an indeterminate period, or recommitted to the state
mental institution. A copy of the judgment and order containing the written findings of
fact and conclusions of law shall be forwarded to the administrator of the forensic facility.
Notice to the counsel for the committed person and the district attorney of the contradic-
tory hearing shall be given at least thirty days prior to the hearing.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1993).
14. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787-88.
15. State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). The
Louisiana Statute provided that "[w~hoever commits the crime of aggravated burglary shall be im-
prisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than thirty years." LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:60 (West 1986). The statutes also required "[w]hoever commits the crime of illegal use of
weapons or dangerous instrumentalities shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or impris-
oned with or without hard labor for not more than two years, or both." LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:94 (West 1986). The defendant committed both crimes. Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1138.
16. Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1139.
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found that Foucha lacked the mental capacity to proceed with trial.17
Four months later, the doctors reported that as a result of a drug-in-
duced psychosis Foucha was insane and unable to distinguish right from
wrong at the time he committed the offenses but was now competent to
stand trial.18 The court held a hearing, and on October 12, 1984, found
Foucha not guilty by reason of insanity, 9 committing him to Feliciana
Forensic Facility at Jackson, Louisiana, until further order of the court
based upon a doctor's recommendation of release.2 °
In 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana made a recommendation to
the court that Foucha be discharged.2" A three-member panel at the
institution reported that Foucha had displayed no evidence of mental
illness since his admittance and recommended a conditional discharge.22
The trial court ordered a re-examination of the defendant by the same
two doctors who had examined him prior to his commitment. Their
finding was that Foucha was "in remission from mental illness," but they
refused to certify that he would not pose a danger to himself or others if
released. 3 The doctors refused to recommend his release because the
17. Id.
18. Id. Louisiana State's criminal procedure provides:
When a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is returned in a capital case, the court
shall commit the defendant to a proper state mental institution or to a private mental
institution approved by the court for custody, care and treatment. When a defendant is
found not guilty by reason of insanity in any other felony case, the court shall remand him
to the parish jail or to a private mental institution approved by the court and shall
promptly hold a contradictory hearing at which the defendant shall have the burden of
proof, to determine whether the defendant can be discharged or can be released on proba-
tion, without danger to others or to himself. If the court determines that the defendant
cannot be released without danger to others or to himself, it shall order him committed to a
proper state mental institution or to a private mental institution approved by the court for
custody, care, and treatment. If the court determines that the defendant can be discharged
or released on probation without danger to others or to himself, the court shall either order
his discharge, or order his release on probation subject to specified conditions for a fixed or
an indeterminate period. The court shall assign written findings of fact and conclusions of
law; however, the assignment of reasons shall not delay the implementation of judgment.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1993).
19. Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986) states "[i]f the
circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable
of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender
shall be exempt from criminal responsibility." In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Foucha
applied Louisiana criminal procedure which states that: "The court may adjudicate a defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity without trial, when the district attorney consents and the court makes a
finding based upon expert testimony that there is a factual basis for the plea." LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 558.1 (West 1967).
20. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (1992).
21. Id.
22. Id. The panel recommended the defendant's release on the condition that he "(1) be placed
on probation; (2) remain free from intoxicating and mind-altering substances; (3) attend a substance
abuse clinic on a regular basis; (4) submit to regular and random urine drug screening; and (5) be
actively employed or seeking employment." Id. at 1782 n.2.
23. Id. at 1782.
[Vol. 28:537
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defendant had an "antisocial personality" and was experiencing para-
noia.2 4 While an antisocial personality disorder is not technically a
mental illness, it did manifest itself by way of Foucha's involvement in
recent altercations at the institution.2" The court therefore refused to
grant his release. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision,
but the United States Supreme Court held that Foucha's due process and
equal protection rights were violated by requiring Foucha, who did not
suffer from a mental illness, to demonstrate that he is not dangerous to
himself or others before being released from a mental hospital.26
The Foucha majority purportedly relied on relevant precedent, Jones
v. United States, in stating that an insanity acquittee could be confined
"as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer."27
However, in emphasizing the absence of a defined mental illness, the
Foucha Court avoided the emphasis Jones placed on dangerousness. This
change in emphasis actually sidesteps the Jones decision.
The Jones Court found that a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity was a "sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquit-
tee for the purposes of treatment and the protection of society."28 Jones,
who was automatically committed to a mental hospital after a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity, claimed that the constitutional limit for
his confinement was the maximum sentence he could have received if
found guilty.2 9 The Jones Court held that because the underlying pur-
pose of an insanity acquittee's confinement was treatment and the protec-
tion of society, the period of his confinement depends on the continuation
of his illness and dangerousness. The Jones Court found that the dura-
tion of commitment necessary for treatment of the illness was unrelated
to the severity of the offense committed.3 ° However, the Jones Court did
24. Id.; State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
25. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1782-83 (1992). The antisocial-paranoid combination
is the most extreme form of the antisocial personality disorder. It is characterized by a hostile and
vindictive pattern of behavior directed against society's ethics, mores and laws. Antisocial-paranoid
individuals usually display "cold-blooded ruthlessness and in intense desire to achieve revenge for
the real or imagined mistreatment they feel they were subjected to during some aspect of their
life.... They usually display an arrogant contempt for the rights of others and will be devoid of any
guilt or remorse for injuring others." THEODORE MILLON & GEORGE S. EVERLY, JR., PERSONAL-
ITY AND ITS DISORDERS 64-65 (1985).
26. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1780.
27. Id. at 1781.
28. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983). In Jones, a defendant was arrested for
attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The maximum prison term for the misde-
meanor, if convicted, was one year. The defendant's condition was diagnosed as paranoid schizo-
phrenia, and he was committed subsequent to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. After the
defendant had been hospitalized for more than one year, he petitioned for release. Id. at 368.
29. Id. at 360.
30. Id. at 368-69.
1993]
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not discuss the standards for "release" of insanity acquittees because it
was not at issue in that case.31
III. THE FOUCHA DECISION AND ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court listed three due process violations
and one equal protection violation as the bases for finding that Foucha's
confinement was unconstitutional. The Court held that the state violated
Foucha's procedural due process rights by continuing his confinement in
a mental institution once he was no longer insane, and additionally, by
failing to hold civil commitment proceedings to justify his continued con-
finement. Furthermore, the Court held that Foucha was restrained arbi-
trarily, thereby violating his substantive due process and equal protection
rights.
A. The Nature of Confinement Must Be Reasonably Related to the
Purpose of Confinement
The nature of an individual's confinement must be reasonably re-
lated to the purpose for which he was confined. 2 In civil commitment
proceedings, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that an individual is mentally ill and requires hospitalization.
3
In contrast, a person who is acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is
committed without the State having to meet the clear and convincing
proof standard. This is justified because once the State has proven all the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant, in order
to avoid punishment, has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that he committed the act as a result of a mental illness.
The verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes that the defend-
ant committed a criminal act as a result of a mental illness.3 4
31. Id. at 363 n.11.
32. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992) (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 368 (1983), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
33. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Addington set the precedent for requiring
states to prove by "clear and convincing" proof an individual's insanity and dangerousness to him-
self or others before he may be committed through civil proceedings. Id. In Addington, the appel-
lant was civilly committed after a finding of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. He asserted
that the standard of proof should be "beyond a reasonable doubt." The United States Supreme
Court stated that:
[h]aving concluded that the preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of
due process and that the reasonable-doubt standard is not required, we turn to a middle
level of burden of proof that strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and
the legitimate concerns of the state.
Id. at 431.
34. Jones, 463 U.S. at 363.
[Vol. 28:537
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Relying on Jones v. United States, the Foucha Court concluded that
an insanity acquittee may be confined as long as he is both mentally ill
and dangerous; furthermore, once he has recovered he must be re-
leased. a5 Since Louisiana conceded that Foucha was no longer insane,
the Court found that the state could not continue to confine him in a
mental institution.36 The Court also relied on Vitek v. Jones37 which
held that confinement in a mental institution is "more than a loss of free-
dom from confinement,", 38 and "qualitatively different from the punish-
ment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of [a] crime. '" 31
Although the Jones v. United States Court emphasized the existence
of the individual's mental illness as an adequate basis for continued de-
tention, this should not obscure the Court's emphasis on the element of
dangerousness as an equally compelling reason for confinement. The
Jones Court adequately stressed the state's dual interest in protecting the
public from dangerous individuals as well as treating their illness by stat-
ing that "[t]he relative 'dangerousness' of a particular individual, of
course, should be a consideration at the release hearings.... [I]t is note-
worthy that petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest in signifi-
cant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity
... ." Although the Foucha Court discussed the necessary relationship
between an individual's confinement and the purpose for which he was
confined, the Court apparently overlooked the purpose of protecting the
public from dangerous criminals.
Furthermore, while Foucha's antisocial condition is not medically
35. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783-84.
36. Id. at 1784.
37. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
38. Id. at 492. Vitek involved a convicted felon who, while serving a prison term, was found by
the prison physician to be mentally ill. He was automatically transferred to a mental hospital under
authority of a Nebraska statute. The Court held that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital
without an adequate hearing violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's finding that
the interest of the State in segregating and treating mentally ill patients is strong. The
interest of the prisoner in not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to
unwelcome treatment is also powerful, however.., the risk of error in making the determi-
nations required by § 83-180 is substantial enough to warrant appropriate procedural safe-
guards against error.
Id. at 495; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (finding that commitment to a
mental hospital has "adverse social consequences" not engendered by convicted criminals).
39. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
40. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.14 (1983). In Jones, the Court was concerned
with an individual's suicidal tendencies. However, "dangerous" includes any perceived danger to
oneself or to others. Id.
1993]
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recognized as a mental illness, it is certainly an abnormal emotional con-
dition that manifested itself by way of violent and aggressive behavior.4"
The record indicates that less than two months prior to his release hear-
ing, Foucha had been sent to a maximum security section of the mental
hospital because of altercations with other mental patients.42 Medical
experts at the hospital attribute his aggressive behavior to the antisocial
personality disorder.43
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas criticized the majority's em-
phasis on the fact that Foucha's condition was not a medically recog-
nized mental illness as the basis justifying his release.' However, the
majority emphasized that medical experts have historically been relied
upon in making commitment determinations in civil proceedings and in
commitment and release proceedings for insanity acquittees. 45
The important differences between civil commitment and commit-
ment pursuant to an insanity defense justify a reliance on more than
medical evidence in determining confinement. In the former, the only
evidence to present is that of the individual's mental condition as diag-
nosed by medical experts. However, in the latter instance, the individual
must also display dangerousness in the form of a criminal act, and that
dangerous propensity should be used to support the expert's testimony.46
In Foucha, the defendant's dangerous and violent behavior, coupled
with the doctors' diagnoses of his antisocial condition, should have ade-
quately substantiated the need for continued confinement. That his dan-
gerous condition is not technically recognized as a mental illness should
not overshadow the obvious need to protect others from its harmful
effects.47
The Foucha Court also found that the confinement of a sane individ-
ual in a mental facility is an infringement on his liberty interest.4 The
41. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1782-83 (1992).
42. Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1782-83.
44. Id. at 1801 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
45. Id. at 1783 n.3.
46. Id. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) ("[The idea that States may not
confine the mentally ill except for the purpose of providing them with treatment is of very recent
origin, and there is no historical basis for imposing such a limitation on state power.... There can be
little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect
society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicable disease."); see also Hickey v.
Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The state has a substantial interest in avoiding prema-
ture release of insanity acquittees, who have committed acts constituting felonies and have been
declared dangerous to society.").
48. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784-85.
[Vol. 28:537
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Court relied on Vitek v. Jones in stating that detention in a mental hospi-
tal is qualitatively different from penal detention, and involuntary com-
mitment of a person to a mental hospital may have "adverse social
consequences" on an individual that is not justified by his criminal acts.49
The Vitek Court recognized that an individual's liberty interest involves
more than his freedom from confinement. A defendant also has a legiti-
mate interest in not wanting to be labeled as insane and confined as such,
so as to avoid the stigma that society still places on mental illness. How-
ever, Vitek is distinguishable in that the Nebraska statute allowed for the
automatic and involuntary transfer of a convicted criminal to a mental
facility upon the finding that he suffered from a mental disease or de-
fect."0 The defendant in Vitek, who did not claim to be insane and did
not want to be confined as such, was not allowed the adequate procedural
protections to protest the decision."
In contrast, however, Foucha's confinement in a mental institution
was not involuntary. As in the case of all insanity acquittees, he affirma-
tively plead insanity, and his confinement was based upon insanity. He
chose to plead and prove insanity in order to avoid punishment for his
crimes. It is not reasonable to now conclude that he will suffer adverse
social consequences as a result of being confined in an institution for the
insane. As the dissent stated, "[a] criminal defendant who successfully
raises the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself,
and thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect."52
B. Due Process Requires Adequate Proceedings Prior to Confinement
Secondly, the Court held that Foucha was denied constitutionally
adequate procedures to determine the basis of his confinement. Since
Foucha is no longer insane, the Court held that he can no longer be
confined as an insanity acquittee in a mental hospital. Therefore, due
process entitles him to additional proceedings to determine the purpose
of any continued confinement.53
Relying on Jackson v. Indiana 54 the Court found that Foucha was
49. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).
50. Id. at 483-84.
51. Id. at 484-85.
52. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1803 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 367 n.16 (1983)).
53. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); and Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
54. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
1993]
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entitled to civil commitment proceedings or additional criminal proceed-
ings prior to his continued detention." However, Jackson is easily dis-
tinguished in that it involved the pretrial detention of an incurable
mentally ill person. The Jackson Court ruled that a state cannot indefi-
nitely commit a person charged with a criminal offense solely on the ba-
sis of his incompetence to stand trial, particularly where there is little
likelihood that he will attain competence.5 6 He is entitled to constitu-
tionally adequate procedures to determine the basis for his
confinement.5 7
Unlike Jackson, Foucha was given his "day in court." He was ade-
quately represented by counsel and affirmatively plead his defense.5 8 His
confinement is the result of his proceedings, not in anticipation of it.
Jones relates "the [g]overnment's strong interest in avoiding the need to
conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity acquit-
tal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded.., and at which
the Government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence." 59
In civil commitment proceedings, the State has the burden of estab-
lishing by clear and convincing proof an individual's insanity and dan-
gerousness acts as a safeguard against arbitrary confinements. In
contrast, the fear of arbitrary confinement is not as great in criminal
commitments since the defendant himself claims to be insane, thereby
eliminating the need for the State to provide the proof. However, if
Foucha is in fact no longer insane, civil commitment proceedings would
only be a waste of the state's resources. The state clearly would not be
able to confine a sane person through civil commitment proceedings, no
matter how dangerous he may be.6" Since the state can no longer confine
Foucha based on the criminal proceedings, the Court has left it with no
choice but to release a dangerous criminal back into society.
C. Arbitrary Restraint Violates Due Process
The third due process right found by the Court to be violated by the
Louisiana statutory scheme was substantive in nature. The state cannot
55. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785.
56. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
57. Id. (noting that since due process requires the nature and duration of confinement to bear a
reasonable relationship to the purpose for confinement, the State must hold civil commitment pro-
ceedings or release a defendant who is unlikely to ever be found competent to stand trial).
58. But see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 558.1 (West Supp. 1993), whereby the defendant may
be committed without a trial.
59. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983).
60. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1803 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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restrain individuals arbitrarily.61 While convicted criminals may be im-
prisoned for reasons of deterrence and retribution,62 the Constitution
limits the state's right to punish certain conduct.63 A state must justify
the confinement of individuals who lack criminal culpability. 6  Since
Foucha was not found "guilty" of his crimes and cannot be punished, the
State must establish the grounds for his confinement.65
In insanity acquittals, the necessary grounds for confinement are
mental illness and dangerousness, but certain circumstances may warrant
other grounds for confinement.66 In United States v. Salerno, the
Supreme Court held that the state's strong and compelling interest in
preventing crime by arrestees provided a legitimate reason to detain cer-
tain dangerous persons. 67 The Foucha Court held that the lower court's
reliance on Salerno was improper.61 In Salerno, the Supreme Court de-
tailed narrow circumstances in which persons who are found to pose a
danger to society may be subjected to limited confinement without con-
stitutionally adequate proceedings. 69  The Foucha Court distinguished
Salerno in finding that the Louisiana statutory scheme was not narrowly
tailored enough to survive due process scrutiny.70 Unlike the limitations
61. Id. at 1785.
62. See Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 958.
63. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (1992); see, eg., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(holding that an Ohio statute that imposes criminal sanctions for advocating violence against minori-
ties is a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (determining that a California statute that criminaizes the addiction to the use of narcotics is
a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
64. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975).
65. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
66. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749-50. The defendant in Salerno was the head of the Genovese crime
family, and the government had evidence that he had, among other things, participated in two mur-
der conspiracies. The government wished to detain the defendant under the Bail Reform Act based
on the seriousness of the charges and the danger that release would present. Salerno contended that
the Act violated the Eighth Amendment in that it allowed for detention on the ground that the
arrestee is likely to commit a crime. Id. at 742-44. The Court held that where the government's
only interest is in preventing flight, the Court must set bail in an attempt to accomplish that goal but
cannot go beyond that. However, where, as here, the Government has a compelling interest in the
safety of the community, dangerous felons could be detained. Id. at 754-55.
67. See infra note 70 for limitations of ruling.
68. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786-87.
69. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. Salerno involved the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of
1984, which requires courts to detain certain dangerous pretrial arrestees who have been proven by
clear and convincing evidence at a hearing to present "an identified and articulable threat to an
individual or the community." Id. at 751. The Act covers only persons who are accused of the most
serious of crimes and who pose a particularly acute problem for society if released. In order to
confine the individual while awaiting trial, the government is required to convince a neutral decision-
maker by clear and convincing proof of the compelling need to confine the individual. Furthermore,
once the government meets the burden, the defendant must be housed separately from those found
guilty and serving sentences. Id. at 747-48.
70. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786-87.
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for confinement in Salerno, the Louisiana statute did not entitle Foucha
to a hearing.71 Moreover, the State was not required to shoulder the
burden of proof, and his period of detention was unlimited in duration. 2
The only evidence presented to justify Foucha's continued confinement
at Feliciana was the report given by the defendant's examining physi-
cians, including their refusal to certify that he would not pose a danger to
himself or others.7 3 The United States Supreme Court found problem-
atic the state's failure to either hold civil commitment proceedings or
further criminal proceedings in response to the defendant's violent be-
havior while at Feliciana.74
However, the statute at issue in Salerno regulated the detention of
pretrial arrestees, and therefore was justifiably narrow in scope. The
Louisiana statute in contrast regulates the release of criminals who have
been confined as a result of constitutionally adequate proceedings.76 The
United States Supreme Court appears to have overlooked this critical
distinction between the two statutes. Furthermore, the Salerno Court
was resolute in holding that "the Government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an indi-
vidual's liberty interest."' 77 Where an individual poses a clear threat to
society, the government has a compelling interest in safety of the com-
munity; thus, dangerous felons may be detained. 8
In comparison the state had legitimate and compelling reasons for
confining Foucha. His dangerousness has been established: he entered
another's home while armed with a loaded .357 revolver; he discharged
the gun; two medical experts diagnosed him as being in remission from a
mental illness but stated that the illness may reappear; they refused to
certify that he would not be a danger to others if released; he has been
involved in altercations while at Feliciana, thus requiring his solitary
confinement. 79 Based on the foregoing facts, it is reasonable to conclude
that the state's continued confinement of Foucha was not arbitrary.
Since due process is a flexible concept which allows the state to ac-




74. Id. (pointing out that the State could have charged the defendant with assault on the other
inmates and incarcerated him in a penal institution if found guilty).
75. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52.
76. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1992).
77. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
78. Id. at 750-51.
79. State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1138-41 (La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
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Court should not interfere with a state's reasonable decision on favoring
the protection of society.A0 Although Foucha is not legally culpable for
his prior crimes, he nevertheless committed the crimes. A verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity is not equivalent to a verdict of not guilty.
8 1
All of the elements of his crimes have been established; if any elements of
the crimes could not have been proven, he would have been acquitted
and would not need the defense. 2 This distinction supports the desire of
the state to further its interest in protecting the public from dangerous
insanity acquittees, though they may no longer be insane.
D. Arbitrary Restraint Violates Equal Protection
In addition to due process, Foucha's equal protection rights were
also found to have been violated.83 While insanity acquittees as a class
may be treated differently than civil committees, the State no longer con-
tended that Foucha was mentally ill. Therefore, the Court held that
treating him differently was unconstitutional.8 4 The Foucha Court was
concerned that the statutory language would eventually lead to the
state's detention of convicted felons after the expiration of their penal
term solely on the basis of dangerousness. 85 The Court stated that it is
likely that many convicted prisoners serving their sentences also suffer
from an antisocial personality, but they are not subjected to additional
confinement based on a finding of dangerousness.86
Reality, however, undercuts the Court's argument because danger-
ousness is indeed a critical factor in determining whether to release a
criminal from prison. A prisoner serving his term must prove that he
would not present a threat to society prior to a grant of his parole.87 In
addition, an inmate involved in altercations in which he assaults other
inmates may receive additional sentences.8 8 The federal government's in-
terest in incapacitating dangerous criminals in order to protect the public
is consistent with the state's interest in protecting the public from the
80. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585-86 (1975); see, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 483-84 (1972).
81. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1797 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Mickenberg, supra note 3, at
952-53.
82. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1797-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1788.
84. Id. (relying on Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1983)).
85. Id. at 1787 n.6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. Donald J. Tyrell, Prediction of Dangerousness, 34 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 24 (1988).
1993]
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dangerously insane. Where the state has a compelling interest in the pro-
tection of the public, an offender's potential for dangerous actions is a
relevant factor whether the release contemplated is from a prison or a
mental hospital.
Furthermore, equal protection does not require identical treatment.
Rather, it requires only that an individual's treatment rationally corre-
sponds to the purpose of his classification. 9 The United States Supreme
Court has held that "[t]he constitution permits qualitative differences in
meting out punishment."90 In determining the appropriate punishment,
the "life and habits" of an offender should be considered by the judge
prior to sentencing.91
Insanity acquittees are justifiably treated differently than civil com-
mittees and convicted prisoners. They are not merely insane; they have
raised and proven insanity by a preponderance of the evidence as a de-
fense against a criminal act they have committed. They are not ordinary
criminals; they are persons whose criminal act was the result of a mental
illness. It is the combination of these two factors which properly distin-
guishes them as a unique class and justifies unique treatment unlike that
given to criminal convicts or civil committees.
Moreover, when an individual is convicted of a crime and serves his
sentence, the purpose for his confinement (retribution and deterrence)
has ended. But in cases where an individual has been acquitted by reason
of insanity, the purpose of the commitment is treatment and protection
of the public.92 Since the time necessary to recover from a mental illness
is impossible to predict, Congress has elected to establish an indetermi-
nate commitment period for both civilly committed persons and insanity
acquittees. Periodic review of the patient's progress toward recovery
provides the method for release, rather than a foreordained term of
confinement. 93
The United States Supreme Court has denied the State of Louisiana
the right to determine the suitability of a criminal offender's release. It
has held that an insanity acquittee's continued confinement is improper,
89. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, Ill (1966) (citing Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231,
237 (1954)).
90. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) ("The mere fact that an indigent in a particu-
lar case may be imprisoned for a longer time than a non-indigent convicted of the same offense does
not... give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
91. Id. (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
92. Jones, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
93. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
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even though one of the two reasons for his commitment, namely, danger-
ousness, still exists, and the other reason is arguably missing. 9' In doing
so, the Foucha majority limits the states' power to assert a "legitimate
and traditional" interest, upheld by a constitutionally adequate proce-
dure, as a basis for the defendant's incarceration.95
V. PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The problems associated with the Foucha decision are: (1) the pre-
mature release of dangerous criminals into society; and (2) the potential
abolition of the Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdict in
many jurisdictions. A feasible solution to both problems is the adoption
of the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict as an alternative to NGRI.
Also, clarification of the terms "dangerousness" and "insanity" and con-
sistent application of tests to determine the existence of these two factors
may aid states in satisfying their duties to both society and mentally ill
citizens.
A. The Premature Release of Dangerous Criminals
One of the weaknesses of the Foucha decision is that it will allow
insanity acquittees to be released once they can prove that they are no
longer afflicted with a mental illness. This is true regardless of the appar-
ent dangerousness of the individual or the nature of the act committed.
This ruling apparently leaves the doors of justice wide open for culpable
defendants to plead insanity and, if successful, escape liability altogether.
As Justice Kennedy points out in his dissent, this very case appears to be
one in which the "petitioner's initial claim of insanity may have been
feigned.",96
Furthermore, in cases such as this one, persons who were insane as a
result of a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the offense should have
no difficulty proving their sanity once they are no longer under the influ-
ences of the mind-altering drug.9 7 This, in effect, creates a complete de-
fense to crimes committed by persons on drugs, provided they can prove
that the drug resulted in their inability to distinguish between right and
wrong.98 Historically, the assertion of drug intoxication in an attempt to
94. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25 and 41-45 for discussion of antisocial personality
as an abnormal emotional condition.
95. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1797.
97. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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prove the lack of mens rea has only been used to mitigate the defendant's
liability, not to exculpate the defendant completely.99 However, the re-
sult of Foucha may be that defendants who commit crimes while on
drugs may claim to have suffered from a drug-induced psychosis rather
than mere intoxication in an attempt to escape punishment. This is par-
ticularly disturbing given the significant correlation between drug use
and criminal activity. 0"
B. NGRI Verdict May Face Abolition
Another problem with the Foucha decision is that it may result in a
breakdown of the NGRI verdict. Since the Court did not make a distinc-
tion with regard to the variance in defendants' conditions of dangerous-
ness, states may be compelled to release extremely dangerous defendants
upon a showing of sanity. As those individuals inevitably commit fur-
ther violent acts, public outrage could very likely result in legislation re-
stricting the NGRI verdict, if not eliminating it altogether as some
jurisdictions have already done. 101
C. Guilty But Mentally Ill As a Practical Solution
The intermediate verdict of GBMI has proven to be a viable alterna-
tive to the insanity defense in twelve states."0 2 Michigan, the first state to
99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1962), reprinted in WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL
LAW, CASES COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (1988), provides:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a
defense unless it negatives an element of the offense... (4) Intoxication which (a) is not
self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication
the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its crimi-
nality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
Id.
100. See Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 631 n.99 (1988) (citing H. HARWOOD, ET AL., ECONOMIC COSTS TO
SOCIETY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1980 (1984) (concluding that an
estimated 10% of homicides in the United States result from drug abuse)); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., Drug
Dependence andAbuse, in CLOSING THE GAP: THE BURDEN OF UNNECESSARY ILLNESS 89, 90, 95-
96 (1987) (estimating that over 2,000 homicides in the United States in 1980 were drug-related and
resulted in the total loss of approximately 70,000 years of life, assuming an average life span of 65
years).
101. See Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 943-44 (discussing this process as it has already been
documented in response to highly publicized trials such as the John Hinckley trial); see also McGin-
ley, supra note 2, at 206-07 (noting that although the insanity defense is still possible in 48 states, a
number ofjurisdictions are contemplating altering or abolishing their insanity statutes in response to
the insanity acquittal of John Hinckley in 1982).
102. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.020(c), 12.47.030, 12.47.050 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 401(b), 408,409, 3905 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT.
Ch. 38, Para. 115-3 (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-1-1 to 35-36-2-5 (Bums 1985 &
Supp.); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 504.120 to 504.130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); Pouncey v.
State, 465 A.2d 475 (Md. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.
16
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adopt the verdict, still retains the NGRI verdict as a defense where ap-
propriate.103 However, GBMI has been added as an alternative for juries
to consider whenever a defendant pleads insanity. Once a defendant is
found GBMI, a hearing is held to determine the level of mental illness
and the appropriate sentencing."° If the defendant is no longer mentally
ill at the time he committed the crime, but his illness did not meet the
test of insanity, as was the case in Foucha, he may be incarcerated in a
penal institution.105 If the defendant is mentally ill, he will receive the
appropriate psychiatric treatment which may or may not involve inpa-
tient treatment. 10 6 Once successfully treated, he will then either be
placed on probation or sent to a prison for the remainder of his sentence
depending on the crime committed and the sentence remaining. 10 7
Opponents of the GBMI verdict claim that it violates an insane per-
son's right to due process and equal protection, as well as Eighth
Amendment rights prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.108 Pri-
marily, they assert that since insanity has no technical legal definition,
the GBMI verdict will result in the punishment of persons who are truly
insane.'0 9 However, states that have adopted the alternate verdict have
found the opposite to be true. Michigan reports that since its adoption of
GBMI, the percentage of defendants who successfully plead insanity as a
defense has remained unchanged.110 Therefore, since the verdict is only
possible after the State has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, de-
fendants in that jurisdiction who have received the GBMI verdict would
otherwise have received a guilty verdict if GBMI had not been available.
Critics of the GBMI verdict further argue that the possibility exists
for an insane defendant to receive a GBMI verdict. However, as evi-
denced by the Foucha decision, the reverse is true as well. Persons who
should justifiably be incapacitated for the good of society sometimes "slip
through the cracks." Nevertheless, a verdict which has the potential of
denying individuals their constitutional rights-in particular, the Eighth
§§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (Michie 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 23A-7-2, 23A-7-16, 23A-26-14, 23A-27-38 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (1990).
103. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 987.
104. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 988 (citing MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36.3 (West
1948)).
105. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 949-50.
106. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 949-50.
107. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 949-50.
108. Judith A. Northrup, Comment, Guilty But Mentally 1. Broadening the Scope of Criminal
Responsibility, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 797, 811, 814 (1983).
109. Christopher Slobogin, Comment, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time
Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 509 (1985).
110. Mickenberg, supra note 3, at 992. A defendant can only receive this verdict if he is found
guilty and insane. Id. at 987-88.
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Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment-should
be closely examined.
Perhaps a different set of guidelines than those presently used for the
verdict may be necessary. For example, jurisdictions may want to con-
sider reserving the option of applying the GBMI verdict for only particu-
larly violent felony cases, ItI such as murder, rape, armed robbery, assault
with a deadly weapon, etc. This would further the state's interest in the
incarceration of criminal defendants who have proven themselves to be a
danger to society, rather than imprisoning a person who, for example,
may have criminal tendencies as a result of mental illness but has never
harmed or threatened anyone. 112 Even though in the jurisdictions that
now recognize the verdict, it only becomes an issue once all the elements
of the crime have been satisfied and the defendant pleads insanity." 3
This extra precaution would alleviate the risk of an insane individual
serving a prison term for only a minor or nonviolent offense.
D. Redefining "'Insanity" and "Dangerousness"
As another solution, perhaps the time has come for a clearer, more
consistent definition of "insanity" for states to follow. Jurisdictions are
split as to the definition of insanity and the proper test for determining a
defendant's state of sanity at the time of a crime. 114 Some degree of in-
consistency originates from the application of the relevant insanity test to
I 11. See Blum, supra note 1, at 9, finding that fifty percent of defendants pleading insanity are
accused of violent or potentially violent crimes.
112. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1983).
113. In the alternative, states might consider making this a verdict that certain defendants may
plead to escape indefinite commitment to a mental institution. For example, in Jones a defendant
who committed petit larceny was indefinitely committed as a result of a finding that paranoid schizo-
phrenia caused him to commit the act. A defendant such as Jones may prefer to plead GBMI and
receive treatment and a possible prison sentence as opposed to indefinite confinement. However, this
should only be available to non-dangerous defendants. In such cases parole could also be condi-
tioned on continued treatment.
114. Donald J. Tyrell, Insanity: A Crazy Defense, 35 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 48, 54-57 (1989).
Several tests are currently used to determine insanity. The author outlines various tests. (1)
M'Naghten test-The defendant is presumed to be sane unless he proves that "he was suffering from
a mental defect or disease which caused a defect in his ability to reason and that as a result, he did
not understand the 'nature and quality' of his act or he did not know that his act was wrong." Id. at
55. (2) Irresistible Impulse test-Under this test, which was "an offshoot and elaboration of the
M'Naghten rule... the defendant would be considered insane 'if by reason of the duress of such
mental disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid
doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed.'" Id. (3) Durham
test-The defendant must prove that "'his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or de-
fect.'" This test expanded the M'Naghten test in that it provided for the testimony of psychiatric
experts as witnesses. The Durham test led to the present reliance on the testimony of psychiatrists in
insanity proceedings. Id. at 55-56. (4) The Model Penal Code-The American Law Institutes test
states:
(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
18
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varying circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, jury confusion
and margin for error may be reduced if a specific test is consistently
applied.
Finally, the dangerousness of the individual should be considered
when applying the verdict. The Foucha decision heightened the need for
the GBMI verdict in certain cases since it eliminated the consideration of
dangerousness from insanity acquittee proceedings. While the state of a
defendant's mental health is critical in making a determination of NGRI
or GBMI, the element of dangerousness deserves tantamount
consideration.
A problem with relying on dangerousness as a basis for confinement
is that the term itself is vague and legally undefined." 5 Historically,
courts have relied on the testimony of medical experts to predict a de-
fendant's propensity for future dangerousness. However, "dangerous-
ness" is not a medical term. A psychiatrist's prediction of future
dangerous behavior is not based upon science since dangerousness is not
recognized as an identifiable personality dimension.1 16 As a result, soci-
ologists, lawyers, judges, and clinicians have placed in doubt the ability
to predict dangerousness. 117
One solution to this problem is to clarify the term "dangerousness"
legally rather than relying solely on the evidence of medical experts.
Similar to the suggestion that states agree on a uniform definition of "in-
sanity," criminal statutes could likewise define "dangerousness" in legal
terms." 8 For example, a finding of dangerousness should be based on
several factors relevant to the crime committed, such as "the magnitude
of the harm; whether the crime was to persons or property; whether the
crime involved physical or psychological harm; and finally, dangerous-
ness must be considered in the light of situational and social contexts."' '
This does not suggest that the testimony of medical experts should
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to either appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As
used in this article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
Id. at 56.
115. Tyrell, supra note 89, at 25-27.
116. Tyrell, supra note 89, at 25-27.
117. Tyrell, supra note 89, at 34-35.
118. Murray L. Cohen et al., The Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 28,
30 (1978). The authors concluded that while many studies have found that the prediction of future
violent behavior cannot be achieved with accuracy, data indicates that a clinical prediction is more
accurate than statistical. They urge clinicians to take their role in predicting such behavior very
seriously given the penalties placed on the defendant which is often based on their testimony. Id. at
28.
119. Tyrell, supra note 89, at 38.
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be completely overlooked as a method of predicting dangerousness. For
example, in one case a defendant was found NGRI of a particularly vi-
cious assault and rape based on the psychiatrist's compelling testi-
mony.12° The doctor determined that the defendant's actions resulted
from his inability to control a basic hatred for women and his inclination
to create situations in which he was likely to act upon his feelings. 21
Based on medical testimony, the court reasonably concluded that the
likelihood was strong that the defendant would continue to be dangerous
if not confined.' 22 The doctor's diagnosis of the defendant's mental con-
dition was appropriate, based on his level of expertise in the field of psy-
chiatry.123 Courts should consider the expert testimony available, but
determine guilt and confinement based on how the testimony comports
with the legal definitions of insanity and dangerousness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Foucha v. Louisiana was a
landmark for the constitutional rights of insanity acquittees. Once ac-
quittees have regained their sanity, the due process and equal protection
clauses require that the state release them or hold adequate civil commit-
ment proceedings to determine a basis for their confinement. The state's
interest in confining mentally ill criminals is to treat their illness and to
protect society. Historically, the individual's propensity for dangerous
behavior has been a factor in determining the suitability of his release.
However, Foucha appears to have overlooked that factor by holding that
dangerousness is irrelevant to confinement once a defendant has regained
his sanity. This decision limits the ability of the states to protect society
from dangerous criminals.
States should respond by enacting legislation that would allow
courts to confine dangerous offenders even after they have regained san-
ity. A verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" in addition to the traditional
verdicts of "guilty" and "not guilty" is one possibility. GBMI, which
already exists in several jurisdictions, is available to juries only when all
elements of a crime have been proven by the State, and when the defend-
ant raises the insanity defense. This verdict allows juries to commit cer-
tain individuals to a mental institution for treatment, but, once treated, it
120. Cohen, supra note 119, at 32.
121. Cohen, supra note 119, at 32.
122. Cohen, supra ntoe 119, at 32.
123. Murray L. Cohen, A. Nicholas Groth, and Richard Siegel conducted this study. Id.
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allows juries to imprison them based on a prediction of future dangerous-
ness for the protection of society.
Further legislation should be aimed at clearly and uniformly defin-
ing "insanity" and "dangerousness" in legal terms rather than strictly
relying on medical testimony. Uniform statutory language and applica-
tion would help to clarify the seemingly arbitrary and subjective process
of commitment proceedings. Such legislative measures would allow
states to adequately deal with the criminally insane.
Angela Paulsen
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